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CHAPTER 11 
Criminal Law, Procedure 
and Administration 
SANFORD J. FOX 
§1I.I. Crime in Massachusetts. The respite from an ever increasing 
spiral of crime observed last yearl appears to have ended. In the 
calendar year 1960 the advance of crime in the Commonwealth con-
tinued from practically every point of measurement. As Table I indi-
cates, in all major offense categories the number of crimes exceeded 
that experienced in preceding years. 
TABLE I 
Number of Major Offenses Committed 
1957-1960 2 
Murder and 
Non-negligent Forcibles 
Manslaughter Rape 
1957 62 
1958 69 217 
1959 60 231 
1960 77 255 
Aggravated 
Robbery Assault Burglary 
950 753 13,594 
1,037 775 15,498 
842 990 14,704 
1,093 1,037 15,954 
Larceny 
over $50 
8,790 
9,091 
8,670 
9,532 
Auto 
Theft 
10,771 
11,014 
10,721 
11,098 
The hope that this increase in the number of offenses reflects merely 
a population increase must be short-lived. Table II shows that the 
crime rate (number of offenses per one hundred thousand of popula-
tion) for each offense climbed above last year's reported rate; in addi-
tion, the 1960 crime rate is higher than the average rate for the three 
preceding years in every classification except auto theft. 
SANFORD J. Fox is Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§11.1. 1 See 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.1. 
:I Compiled from 1958 Uniform Crime Reports 64-65, 1959 Uniform Crime Reports 
34-35, and 1960 Uniform Crime Reports 34-!l5. Definitions of all offenses herein 
mentioned may be found in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §lO.l nn.!I-9. 
8 There are no figures for forcible rape in 1957, since prior to 1958 the rape count 
included nonforcible "statutory" offenses. 
1
Fox: Chapter 11: Criminal Law, Procedure and Administration
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1961
112 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §ll.l 
TABLE II 
Number of Major Offenses per One Hundred Thousand 
of Population: 1957-1960 4 
Murder and 
Non-negligent Forcible Aggravated 
Manslaughter Rape Robb~ry Assault. 
1957 1.3 19.7: 15.6·· 
1958 1.4 4.5 21.3( 15.9 --
1959 1.2 4.5 16.5/ 19.4-
21.2} , v· 1960 1.5 5.0 20.1 
"' 
Rate ';. 
Change 
1960 over 
1957·1959 
Average +15.4% +11.1% + 6.3% + ~.7% 
!-arceny 
Burglary Over $50 Auto Theft 
1957 281.6 182.1 223.1 
1958 318.8 187.0 226.5 
1959 287.5 169.5 209.6 
1960 309.9 185.1 215.6 
Rate 
Change 
1960 over 
1957-1959 
Average + 4.7% + 3.1% 1.9% 
Although it is thus clear that the situation in Massachusetts is getting 
worse, it is pertinent to ask if it is doing so any more or less drastically 
than in New England as a whole or in the United States. That is, is 
ground being lost to crime in these two other reporting areas at a 
greater rate, a smaller rate, or are the changes roughly the same? 
Table III contains the data from which an answer may be estimated. 
Obviously no one generalization can be supported. Murders and 
non-negligent manslaughters are outstripping population about twice 
as fast in Massachusetts. Auto thefts, on the other hand, seem to be 
more under control in the Commonwealth than in New England or 
in the United States, and by a substantial margin. The same is true for 
burglaries and serious larcenies, although the differential is not quite 
so wide. For the remaining two offenses, forcible rape and robbery, 
our local deterioration falls between the rate of decline in the two 
other areas: better than the United States record and worse than that 
of New England for forcible rape, and vice versa for robbery. 
4 Compiled from 1958 Uniform Crime Reports 64-65. 1959 Uniform Crime Reports 
34-35. and 1960 Uniform Crime Reports 34-35. 
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TABLE III 
Changes in Crime Rate for Massachusetts, 
New England, and the United States: 
1960 over 1957-1959 Average 
Murder and 
Non-negligent 
Manslaughter 
Massachusetts 
New England 
United States 
Massachusetts 
New England 
United States 
(Percent) 
+15.4 
+ 7.1 
+ 7.8 
Burglary 
(Percent) 
+ 4.7 
+ 6.5 
+20.5 
Forcible 
Rape 
(Percent) 
+11.1 
+17.3 
+ 3.0 
Robbery 
(Percent) 
+ 5.3 
- 2.8 
+18.9 
, Larceny over 150 
{Eercent) 
+ 3.1 
+11.6 
+18.9 
A. DECISIONS 
Aggravated 
Assault 
(Percent) 
+ 6.7 
+ 5.4 
+ 8.7 
Auto Theft 
(Percent) 
- 1.9 
+ 7.1 
+12.6 
§1l.2. Sexually dangerous person. Two cases were decided by the 
Supreme Judicial Court during the 1961 SURVEY year that shed inter-
pretive light on portions of the Massachusetts sex offender law.1 In 
Commonwealth v. Ackers2 the Court ruled on exceptions taken to a 
denial of Ackers' petition for a writ of habeas corpus and to rulings 
under the sex offender law in which the Superior Court ordered him 
committed to the treatment center of the Massachusetts Correctional 
Institution at Bridgewater. This was the second time that Ackers had 
been the subject of such an order. In 1954 he had been sentenced to 
the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole for assault with 
intent to murder and carnal abuse of a child. Five years later, while 
Ackers was serving these sentences at Walpole, he was found to be "sex-
ually dangerous'" within the meaning of the statute and transferred 
to the treatment center for such persons at Walpole.3 When Ackers 
sought to be discharged from this indeterminate life term one year 
later in April, 1960, the Superior Court ruled that the Walpole treat-
ment center existed in words only and ordered him released from any 
such center.4 Approximately three months later Ackers' custodian at 
§11.2. 1 C.L.. c. 12!1A. §§1 et seq. 
21961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107. 175 N.E.2d 677. 
3 The adjudication was on petition of the District Attorney of Plymouth County 
under C.L.. c. 12!1A. §6. 
4 This lower court ruling followed the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Commonwealth v. Page. !I!I9 Mass: !ll!1. 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959). ten months earlier 
that the failure to establish a treatment center in fact. as well as semantically. pre-
vented commitments under Chapter 12!1A. the sexually dangerous persons law. 
However. Commonwealth v. Hogan. !l41 Mass. 372. 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960). the 
second case discussed in this section. indicates a marked retreat from this position. 
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Walpole, acting under Section 6, sent him to the thirteen-month-old 
treatment center at Bridgewater for an administrative (psychiatric) 
ruling on whether Ackers was a "sexually dangerous person." An 
affirmative finding produced the Superior Court commitment order 
which was the subject of the present case. 
In response to Ackers' exceptions the Supreme Judicial Court ruled: 
(1) In spite of the indeterminate life commitment, the proceedings 
under Chapter 123A are civil, not criminal. It follows from this that 
the concept of double jeopardy does not apply to the commitments to 
treatment centers subsequent to the prison commitment. (2) Ackers 
was properly returned to serve his sentences at Walpole after the April, 
1960, finding that no treatment center existed at that institution; the 
earlier 1959 commitment order to such a center did not operate to 
vacate these sentences. (3) The statute is not unconstitutional for 
vagueness. "Its provisions carefully define the mental condition for 
which treatment is to be afforded and the procedural steps required 
for such treatment." Ii 
The second case involving the sexually dangerous persons law was 
Commonwealth v. Hogan. 6 This too came to the Supreme Judicial 
Court after a finding of sexual dangerousness and a commitment order 
to Bridgewater for an indeterminate life period. In his exceptions to 
the denial of his motion for a new hearing the defendant raised the 
question of whether there was in fact a treatment center as required 
by the statute.7 
The exceptions were overruled, the Court finding on the merits that 
there was such a treatment center as satisfied the statute. The statutory 
requirement, not mentioned in the opinion, is merely that a center be 
established and staffed.8 Two lines of reasoning were used to support 
the decision. One is that what is now denominated a treatment center 
is different from what was called a treatment center when the Page case 
was decided.1I It will be recalled that Page held that "the summary 
procedure established for dealing with sexually dangerous persons can 
be employed only to commit a person for treatment in the centers 
established for such treatment, and a commitment pursuant to such 
procedure that is tantamount to a prison sentence is invalid." 10 Spe-
cifically, "there was no separate staff for the treatment of sex offenders 
and the only treatment then available to persons committed to the 
center and not under diagnostic observation was the 'program of group 
Ii Commonwealth v. Ackers, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 175 N.E.2d 677. 
6341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960). 
7 The defendant also claimed that the court below had abused its discretion in 
denying his motion on the grounds of new evidence. The Court summarily found 
no abuse of discretion, citing Sharpe, Petitioner, 322 Mass. 441, 444·445, 77 N.E.2d 
769, 771 (1948). 341 Mass. at 377, 170 N.E.2d at 330. The opinion does not indicate 
the nature of the new evidence. 
8 G.L., c. 12M, §2. 
II 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959). 
10 Commonwealth v. Hogan, 341 Mass. 372,170 N.E.2d 327 (1960). 
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and individual psychiatric therapy for the total prison population 
which might include some sex offenders.' "11 The Court found a suffi-
cient difference in that the present center is not at the state prison in 
Walpole; it is at the state hospital in Bridgewater for the criminal in-
sane. Secondly, there is sufficient segregation of the sex offenders from 
the criminal insane by virtue of the fact that the sleeping quarters are 
"separated from the rest of the hospital by double doors which were 
kept locked," 12 even though dining, infirmary, and recreational facili-
ties are shared with the criminal insane. In Page, the Hogan Court 
noted, "we decided that there was . . . a confinement in a prison 
which is undifferentiated from the incarceration of convicted crim-
inals." 13 
In addition to noting that things are favorably different, the Court 
also relied on its view that "the departments of correction and mental 
health were endeavoring to set up a center that would comply with the 
statutes." 14 The opinion sounds a note of optimism on these efforts. 
"We cannot assume that the necessary action to establish a fully ade-
quate treatment center, already begun, will not be carried to comple-
tion." 15 Probably of some influence in this view is the twice·men-
tioned fact that "there is available to the center the general medical 
staff of the hospital, a diagnostic staff of two physicians, and two psy-
chiatric social workers." 16 
Taken together, the Ackers and Hogan cases indicate a missed op-
portunity for the Court to exercise the lawyer's skill in shaping the law 
to meet the facts of life. In an abstract way, the Ackers ruling that 
commitment as a sexually dangerous person does not vacate unexpired 
criminal sentences makes good sense. It may be that during such a 
commitment the treatment staff would decide that punishment - the 
disciplinary and impersonal regime of a penal institution - is thera-
peutically advisable. Such a limit-setting environment ought to be 
available to the doctors if it can be of rehabilitative value.17 It is sug-
gested, however, that the question ought to turn on this kind of con-
sideration, not on whether there are precedents to support one view 
or the other. The Court could usefully have directed its attention to 
the relationship of criminal sentences to therapeutic commitment un-
der Chapter 123A. It may be that the experts would opine that these 
are rationally mutually exclusive - that is, prison terms are invariably 
of negative therapeutic value. Perhaps this ruling thus makes none-
sense instead of good sense. Regardless of the precise form of the case 
for or against the ruling that commitment under Chapter 123A does 
11341 Mass. at 376,170 N.E.2d at 330. 
12341 Mass. at 374,170 N.E.2d at 329. 
18341 Mass. at 376,170 N.E.2d at 329. 
14 341 Mass. at 376, 170 N.E.2d at 330. 
15341 Mass. at 377, 170 N.E.2d at 330. 
16341 Mass. at 374, 376,170 N.E.2d at 329. 
17 See Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. lIl, lIS n.46 
(1961). 
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not vacate criminal sentences, it is perfectly clear that a sound and 
effective administration of the law demands more than conceptual 
congruity and the solution of problems solely by an examination of 
the index to the Massachusetts reports. 
Beyond disagreement, however, is the Ackers finding that the law 
carefully defines those who are subject to its provisions; it is beyond 
disagreement and simply incredible. In the 1959 SURVEY the present 
writer sought to unscramble the definition the Court finds to be of con-
stitutional clarity.18 The only conclusion to which a careful examina-
tion leads is that the law is so vague, so ambiguous, and so replete with 
semantic gymnastics that it amounts to a delegation of wholly unfet-
tered discretion to examining psychiatrists to find sexual dangerousness 
in those in whom they are pleased to find it. Indeed, the psychiatric 
testimony cited by Mr. Justice Williams in Ackers proves this. The 
psychiatrist concluded that Ackers was sexually dangerous by finding 
several items not at all relevant to the definition (the act was brutal 
and vicious; Ackers had no remorse; he was unstable and a danger); 
by finding only one item mentioned in the definition (the act was com-
pulsive); and, finally, by finding the very opposite of what the defini-
tion requires (his prison conduct does not indicate sexual violence or 
abnormality).19 No doubt this may be the best a qualified psychiatrist 
can do. The definition is not workable. If there is any definition that 
does not "carefully define" both theoretically and practically this is it. 
The most regrettable aspect of these cases, however, is the ruling in 
Hogan that there is a "treatment" center in fact in existence. This 
question would seem to tum on whether. there is "treatment" being 
given to committed persons. The fact that the locus is not in the state 
prison has little bearing on this. The fact that officials are doing their 
best has only slightly more relevance; the statute does not say that per-
sons may be committed to an "almost" treatment center. In fact the 
statute orders that "The commissioner of mental health shall appoint 
to such center . . . adequate personnel for the care, treatment and 
rehabilitation of such persons committed to their care." 20 How can 
the Court acknowledge that "There are no full time personnel assigned 
to the center, but part-time personnel are available to meet the treat-
ment needs of the center from day to day" 21 and yet find that the stat-
utory requirement of "adequate personnel" has been met? The legis-
lature must have meant something more than that there is to be some-
one with a syringe available to sedate a rambuncious prisoner. 
The impression that Chapter 123A ought to be repealed outright is 
further strengthened by these most recent increments to its meaning. 
§1l.3. Revision of sentence. The authority of the Superior Court 
to alter a sentence already pronounced was considered in District 
181959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.3. 
19 Commonwealth v. Ackers, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 175 N.E.2d 677. 
90 G.L., c. 12M, §2. 
21 Commonwealth v. Hogan, 541 Mass. 572, 170 N.E.2d 527 (1960). 
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Attorney v. Superior Court.1 Two defendants, Roderick and Sileno, 
were found guilty in the Superior Court of permitting premises to be 
used for gambling purposes. Roderick was sentenced to six months in 
the county house of correction and was taken upon mittimus to the 
county jail adjoining the courthouse, where he remained for ten days, 
at which time the judge who presided at his trial issued a writ of habeas 
corpus for him to be returned for resentencing. A fine was thereupon 
substituted for the imprisonment. Sileno's case was similar except that 
in the substituted sentence he was given a four-month suspended term 
and placed on probation. The district attorney petitioned the Su-
preme Judicial Court for writs of mandamus to have the defendants 
returned to the house of correction to serve their original sentences. 
The petitions were dismissed. 
The reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court was: (I) the question 
of whether a partially executed sentence could, with the prisoner's 
consent, be altered during the same sitting of court as that in which the 
original sentence was granted was one of first impression in Massachu-
setts.2 (2) English common law permitted the sentence to be altered 
during the same term of court without regard to whether the original 
sentence was partially served.s (3) There is a decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States permitting a federal district court to reduce 
an imprisonment sentence partly served.4 (4) There is no policy reason 
for holding that partial execution of a sentence cuts off the trial judge's 
revision authority.5 (5) Trial judges should be given the opportunity 
to implement a "change of heart" produced by reflection or new 
evidence.6 
The fact that the new sentence was less severe than the original and 
that the defendant had consented to the substitution led the Supreme 
Judicial Court to distinguish this case from several earlier Massachu-
setts decisions, going back as much as one hundred years, in which 
statements are made to the effect that partial execution of the sentence 
prevents sentence modification.7 In none of these cases, the Court 
noted, were the factors of reduction and consent present. Therefore, 
the statements were treated as dictum and the question treated as an 
unsettled one. 
In focusing on the question of policy the Court approached the heart 
of the matter. The policy of whether to leave to the legislature the 
task of unseating what courts for one hundred years have considered 
to be settled law received, however, no attention. What is basically at 
stake is the enigmatic nature of the whole sentencing process. The 
things a judge takes into consideration and the subsidiary judgments 
§11.3. 1342 Mass. 119, 172 N.E.2d 245 (1961). 
2342 Mass. at 121·122, 172 N.E.2d at 247. 
s 342 Mass. at 122·123, 172 N.E.2d at 247. 
4 United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304,51 Sup. Ct. 113, 75 L. Ed. 354 (1930). 
5 District Attorney v. Superior Court, 342 Mass. 119, 172 N.E.2d 245 (1961). 
6 342 Mass. at 128, 172 N .E.2d at 250-2.51. 
7 The cases are discussed in 342 Mass. at 123-126, 172 N .E.2d at 248-250. 
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that move him to sentence one way or another rank among the mys-
teries of the universe.8 Making an example of the offender, punish-
ing him, rehabilitating him, taking him out of circulation for a period 
- these are all goals that may be involved, and any given judge may 
be guessing as to how best to achieve some or all of them. Is there any 
reason why he should be restricted to one guess per offender? 
The Court says that if his second guess moves him to reduce the 
sentence within a reasonable time (the period of the sitting), he may 
do so, even if action has been taken under the first guess. The burden 
that this may impose upon administration may, however, be a sub~ 
stantial one. Since there is nothing precise about the sentencing 
process, there is almost an infinite amount of material that is poten-
tially relevant.9 It would certainly be a most unenterprising attorney 
(or offender) who could not find something else that has a favorable 
bearing on his sentence. There is no reason why a sentenced person 
should not continually submit new petitions for reconsideration during 
the whole of the sitting in which he was originally sentenced. For how 
long this may go on depends on the length of the "sitting," and this is 
completely in the hands of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court. tO 
True, there would be wide discretion in ruling on such requests. But 
quaere if the court can deny them out of hand, without giving them 
some thought. In short, there is much to be said for a rule of finality 
foreclosing what the Supreme Judicial Court here permitted. 
§1l.4. Strict liability: Gaming. One of the areas of statutory penal 
law that has been the subject of extensive critical comment is that deal-
ing with crimes that do not contain as one of their elements an ac-
cused's mental state.t Some writers believe that courts have been too 
ready to accept ambiguous statutes as imposing strict liabiIity,2 while 
others who have made extensive examination of penal statutes have 
declared that the dominant trait of these laws is their ambiguity on this 
question.3 
In Commonwealth v. Murphy" the Supreme Judicial Court dealt 
with these problems under a statute that provides: "Whoever . . . 
occupies, or is found in any place ... with apparatus, books or any 
device, for registering bets ... shall be punished ... " II The de-
fendant was convicted of being found in a room with material for 
registering bets on horse races in violation of this statute. In denying 
his pre-trial motion to quash the complaint, the court below had inter-
preted the complaint as not alleging that the material was under the 
8 See Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, 20 Fed. Prob. 15 (1956). 
9 See Fitzgerald, The Presentence Investigation, 2 N.P.P.A.J. !!20 (1956). 
10 G.L., c. 212, §14A-
§ll.4. t E.g., Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 1M!! (1958); 
Fox, Statutory Criminal Law, 52 J. Crim. L., C. Be P.S. !!92, !!97 (1961). 
2 Mueller, supra, at llO!!. 
3 Remington, Liability Without Fault - Criminal Statutes - Their Relation to 
Major Developments in Contemporary Economics and Social Policy: The Situation 
in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 625. 
" !!42 Mass. !!9!!, 17!! N .E.2d 6!!0 (1961). 
II G.L., c. 271, §17. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1961 [1961], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1961/iss1/14
§11.5 CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION 119 
defendant's control or that he was even cognizant of its presence.6 He 
was thus found guilty of merely being present in the named room. 
In his exceptions he challenged the meaning given the statute by the 
ruling on his motion. The Supreme Judicial Court found the ruling 
erroneous and ordered a new trial. 
Since the complaint followed closely the words of the statute, it was 
sufficient to state a crime. The statute, however, does not impose strict 
liability, and therefore the complaint should not have been construed 
as so doing. The Court arrived at the conclusion that mere presence 
is not what the statute proscribes by examining its legative predeces-
sors and history.7 As to the precise requirements of the statute, the 
Court said: "We need not consider what circumstantial evidence may 
be enough to show that a defendant, present in a room in which there 
is apparatus, is sufficiently associated with it to be convicted of being 
'found with . . . apparatus.''' 8 The Court is thus wisely permitting 
both prosecutors and lower courts to participate in the development of 
statutory meaning. 
One of the most significant portions of the opinion occurs following 
the Court's acknowledgment of legislative authority to create strict 
liability offenses. "But an intention to create such an offense should 
appear in clear and unambiguous language." 9 As a statement of an 
interpretative presumption to the effect that the common law require-
ment of mens rea is to be continued unless the legislature clearly speaks 
to the contrary, this is a most commendable step forward.10 It is dis-
heartening to observe, however, that in a footnote example to the sen-
tence just quoted the Court cites G.L., c. 94, §213A, which punishes 
"Whoever is present where a narcotic drug is illegally kept or de-
posited .. ." This certainly should not be accepted as a clear intent 
to create strict liability. It makes as little sense to punish mere pres-
ence here as it does in the Murphy case. The words "is present" can 
easily bear a meaning that includes some knowledge. It appears that 
the standard of clarity and the force of the presumption alluded to in 
Murphy are still some long distance from achievement. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§1I.5. Chemical tests for intoxication. Massachusetts has now 
joined the thirty other states that have statutes dealing with the pro-
bative relationship of blood alcohol to driving under the influence of 
intoxicating liquors.1 The statute2 makes admissible the percentage, 
6 Commonwealth v. Murphy, !l42 Mass. !l9!1, !l94, 17!1 N.E.2d 6!10, 6!11 (1961). 
7 !l42 Mass. at !l95-!l96, 17!1 N.E.2d at 631-632. 
8 !l42 Mass. at 397-398, 17!1 N.E.2d at 63!1. 
9 342 Mass. at 397, 17!1 N .E.2d at 6!12. 
10 See Hart, The Arms of the Criminal Law, 23 Law Be Contemp. Prob. 492 (1958). 
§11.5. 1 See Note, Chemical Tests for Intoxication: A Legal, Medical, and Con-
stitutional Survey,!l7 N.D.L. Rev. 212, 217 n.36 (1961). 
2 G.L., c. 90, §(I)(e), enacted by Acts of 1961, c. 340. The act is further noted in 
§20.5 infra. 
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by weight, of alcohol in an accused person's blood at the time of the 
alleged driving under the influence of liquor, prohibited by G.L., c. 90, 
§l(a). The alcoholic content of the blood may be shown by chemical 
test of the blood or of the breath. Blood may be taken only by a 
physician and, if done so by direction of the police, with the consent of 
the accused. The statute also gives the accused the right to be in-
formed of the results of the test and to an independent test at his own 
expense. Evidence of failure or refusal to consent to a blood or breath 
test may not be admitted against the noncomplying person in either 
a civil or a criminal proceeding. 
In addition, the statute contains the triad of presumptions common 
to these laws. If the alcohol concentration is .05 or less, there is a 
presumption of not being under the influence; if more than .05 but less 
than .15, there is no presumption; if .15 or more, there is a presump-
tion that the individual is under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
It is not clear whether a conviction may be had solely upon the evi-
dence of blood alcohol. It appears that only one state, Wisconsin, has 
a statute that specifically requires corroboration of chemical test re-
sults.s The Massachusetts statute ought to be interpreted in the same 
vein, however, since there is always the possibility of an individual who 
may have a high concentration of alcohol and yet retain virtually intact 
his perceptive and motor skills.4 Conversely, it should not be a com-
plete defense that the concentration was below .05, since one not ac-
customed to alcohol may show signs of inebriation with a lesser blood 
alcohol value.5 An amendment making clear that neither defense nor 
conviction may be predicated solely on the chemical tests would be 
desirable. 
§1l.6. Parole. Early in the 1961 SURVEY year several important 
changes were enacted in regard to the organization, jurisdiction, and 
operation of parole in the Commonwealth. Almost all of these changes 
are distinct improvements in the parole system, and it may be that this 
kind of progress will have some impact on the ultimate goal of reduc-
ing the high proportion of released persons who return to criminal 
activities'! 
The state parole board was revamped in several respects. Although 
s See Slaugh and Wilson, Chemical Testing for Intoxication, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 
673, 684 n.28 (1960). 
4 See Bourke and Sonenberg, Blood Tests and Intoxication, 27 Austl. L.J. 373, 374 
(1953), citing a study indicating that even at .18 percent only 80 percent "showed 
clinical signs of moderate intoxication including diminution of control, mental con-
dition and disorders of co-ordination." 
5 Slaugh and Wilson, supra note 3, at 682. 
§11.6. 1 The report of the Commissioner of Correction for 1959 indicates that 
77.5 percent of the inmates in the Walpole institution had served former commit-
ments; the corresponding figure in Concord was 67.5 percent, while at Framingham 
it was 63.9 percent. Statistical Reports of the Commissioner of Correction for the 
Year Ending December 31, 1959, Pub. Doc. No. 115, p. 31. Obviously much remains 
to be accomplished in terms of influencing post-release behavior. 
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the board still consists of five members, all must now devote full time 
to this work,2 instead of merely the chairman and the two male mem-
bers. The sexual composition of the board has also been changed. 
Formerly the law required three men and two women.3 Now it is 
merely prohibited to appoint an all-male board or an all-female board.4 
If appointments to the board are to be made strictly on the basis of 
qualifications for the responsibility, this increased flexibility and re-
quirement of full-time commitment can produce the greater skill, ex-
perience, and sharpness of judgment demanded by an effective parole 
system. Significant salary increases further serve to promote the attrac-
tion and retention of qualified members.5 On the other hand, the new 
statute frankly enacts the legislative opinion that the political composi-
tion of the board is of paramount importance: both major political 
parties must be represented.6 
One additional significant change in organization remains to be 
noted. The administrative responsibilities of the chairman have been 
greatly increased by having him appoint and remove all parole agents 
and other members of the parole staff.7 Formerly this was the respon-
sibility of the whole board.s Since the statutory position of director 
of parole services has also been abolished,9 it appears that provision 
for supervisory activity will have to be made by the chairman through 
use of his new appointing authority. 
The actual functioning of the parole board has also been altered. 
Female members are no longer prohibited from participating in deci-
sions concerning male prisoners.1o Under the reorganization any three 
members may act as the parole board for any parole decision, thus 
eliminating the necessity of total participation in the female cases as 
well as eliminating the distinction between male and female members. 
A further change in the way the board does its business appears to 
take a step backward when steps forward were called for. Before the 
new statute each member of the board was required to make a matter 
of record, "in clear and concise form the reasons for his decision in the 
matter of granting a parole permit to a prisoner serving a sentence for 
2 Acts of 1960, c. 765, §l, repealing and replacing G.L., c. 27, §4. 
S Acts of 1955, c. 770, §l. 
4 " ••• at least one shall be a man and one a woman." Acts of 1960, c. 765, §l, 
repealing and replacing G.L., c. 27, §4. 
Ii The chairman's annual salary goes from $1l,000 to $14,000; the other members 
received increases from $10,000 to $12,000. Since the women must now serve full 
time their salary is also $12,000. 
6 Acts of 1960, c. 765, §l. 
7 Ibid. 
S G.L., c. 27, §6, repealed by Acts of 1960, c. 765, §2A. 
9 Acts of 1960, c. 765, §2A, repealing G.L., c. 27, §6. 
10 General Laws, c. 27, §4, repealed and replaced by Acts of 1960, c. 765, §l, pro· 
vided: "All the members of the board shall constitute the parole board having 
jurisdiction over the granting and revocation of paroles for women, and only the 
men members of the board shall constitute the parole board having jurisdiction 
over the granting and revocation of paroles for men." 
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a felony or to a defective delinquent." 11 Since it is generally true that 
the need to produce reasons tends to produce reasoning, the old law 
was an influence for rational decision-making in the cases to which it 
applied. Under such a system the parole board records, together with 
information as to the subsequent careers of parolees, would be an in-
valuable source of guidance to the board itself on the matter of rightly 
or wrongly giving weight to one factor or another in the inmates' 
records. That is, the board may be correctly or incorrectly predicting 
an individual's future, and one way of utilizing past experience to 
sharpen present predictions is to look back and see if what appeared 
to be important prospectively turned out to be so retrospectively. The 
recording of reasons could thus have been wisely expanded to include 
all cases in the board's jurisdiction. Instead, however, the new law 
makes no mention at all of setting forth reasons for a parole decision. 
The 1960 statute produces a wide broadening of the jurisdiction of 
the parole board. It now has responsibility for parole decisions relat-
ing to prisoners in jails or houses of correction whose sentences are for 
one year or more.12 The last count available indicates that during the 
year 1959 there were 829 inmates sentenced to these institutions whose 
release is now governed by the parole board.1s The burden this re-
sponsibility places on the board is somewhat mitigated by provision 
for preliminary hearings at the county institutions by one or more 
members14 and, by implication, action by the board on such cases with-
out any further personal interview.15 In addition, the law now re-
quires the custodians of county prisoners to assemble all background 
information ("the circumstances of the crime, the nature of his sen-
tence, the court in which he was sentenced, the name of the judge and 
district attorney, and copies of such probation reports as may have 
been made, as well as reports as to the prisoner's social, physical, mental 
and psychiatric condition and history")16 as each prisoner is received 
and make it readily accessible when the parole board is considering 
each case.17 
On its face, this section makes no distinction between prisoners re-
ceived whose sentences have their release governed by the parole board 
11 G.L., c. 127, §134, repealed and replaced by Acts of 1960, c. 765, §5. 
12 Acts of 1960. c. 765. §3. repealing and replacing G.L.. c. 127. §128, whicb had 
placed parole authority in the various County Commissioners in all counties save 
Suffolk. where decisions were made by the Penal Institutions Commissioner. 
IS Statistical Reports of the Commissioner of Correction for the Year Ending 
December 31, 1959. Pub. Doc. No. 115. p. 38. These inmates are, however, only 
6.2 percent of the total commitments for the year. Ibid. 
14 Acts of 1960, c. 765. §2. repealing and replacing G.L.. c. 27, §5. 
15 Acts of 1960. c. 765. §5, repealing and replacing G.L.. c. 127, §134, requires 
that inmates of state correctional institutions be seen by a majority of the board. 
The sentence following mentions the preliminary hearing for county prisoners and 
a report to the board for final action. 
16 Acts of 1960, c. 765. §6. repealing and replacing G.L., c. 127, §135. 
17 Ibid. 
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and those whose release is still controlled by county officials. This is 
probably an oversight, since the next section of the statute provides 
for a probation officer's investigation of certain county inmate cases 
and this would be largely duplicating the material assembled under the 
prior section.l8 
18 Id. §7, repealing and replacing the first sentence of G.L., c. 127, §14I. 
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